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ABSTRACT
States are path dependent entities that deviate solely in the face of catastrophic
failures in the pursuit of axiomatic ends by conventional means. The inertia of
bureaucratic institutions, a foreign policy consensus within a self-reproducing elite of
experts, the self-interest of political elites and a sense of “national self” or identity lead
states to understand themselves in light of a history and a relative level of status on the
world stage. Since the end World War II, the U.S. has a certain path that places the
spread of democracy and laissez-faire capitalism extremely important if not vital foreign
policy goals. In the case of the transition from the Soviet Union to Russia through the
1990s, movement toward laissez-faire capitalism and democratization were conflated
and the U.S.’s democratization programs in Russia from 1989 to 2004 were
predominantly focused on the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism to the former socialist
republics. These programs were shaped by and in line with a rendition of modernization
theory proposed by Francis Fukuyama and scholars sharing his ideologically shaped
views. This theory assumed that positive outcomes like democracy and market reform
were related, interconnected, and self-reinforcing. This is incompatible with the theory of
democratization I’ve built, based on the works of Norm Eisen, Larry Diamond, and
ii

Seymour Lipset. Moving forward this ideological position must be abandoned to
implement efficacious democratization programs. However, given the role capitalist
values, corporate interests trade play in the U.S.’s political path I struggle to see that
change being made.

iii
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CHAPTER ONE: PATH DEPENDANCY
By virtue of existing in a politically, and economically, interconnected world,
modern states inevitably evolve an elite of foreign policy officials, intellectuals, and lowlevel officers with ideological commitments to a state's “path” across what Bismarck
calls “the stream of time.” 1 This path is self-reinforcing as alliance patterns are formed,
other states determine the incompatibility of their foreign policy goals with other state’s,
and every year new classes of bureaucrats and diplomats learn “the way things are done.”
This path dependency is stronger than the wills, and whims, of elected officials and the
political appointees they put atop these agencies. Although there is some evidence to
suggest destroying the agency entirely is possible, they can do little to change the
fundamental goals, and traditional methods of achieving those goals, that agencies
engage in. Assuming they didn’t share those same fundamental goals to begin with. 2
Over the course of this paper I will outline the paths I perceive as central to Russian and
American political development. This will necessarily include philosophical and
ideological conceptions of “identity” and the international order. Secondly, I will
consider the question of states engaging in foreign “democratization missions” and then

1

von Bismarack Otto. Gedanken und erinnerungen. BoD–Books on Demand, 2012.

2

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.
1

directly respond to the theoretical models of democratization put forth by Francis
Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.
I will, also, build my own action model based on the theories of Juan Linz, Larry
Diamond, Seymour Lipset, and Norman Eisen. Thirdly, I will describe the policies and
actions the U.S. undertook from 1989 to 2004 in Russia and Eastern Europe. I believe
that traditional democracy supporting apparatuses, funded programs, public speeches, and
seemingly unrelated actions had a direct effect on the viability of the U.S.
democratization mission in Russia. Finally, in comparing the theoretical model of
democratization and the policy record of the U.S. I will offer my critique and an insight
into the true intentions of U.S. democratization efforts in this instance.
What a state has done in the past is a heavy weight on its future actions;
potentially even more so internationally than domestically. A state’s previous actions,
history of engagement, and conception of the intention of other actors will compel that
state to enact a foreign policy that is, very often, consistent with its historical record. As
early realist scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote in Politics Among Nations, “a state’s foreign
policy is largely consistent within itself.” 3 In fact, Morgenthau argues that his ambition
in realism is to create a model of international relations that does not assume the directive
preeminence of the wishes and whims of particular leaders; whether that is because they
are ineffective at orchestrating change, governing, or simply enunciating what policy
changes they envision. In effect, Morgenthau was arguing against the liberal tendency he

3

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.
2

saw at the time to hypothesize that states, undergoing leadership transitions, could also
undergo massive policy transitions as well.
He disagrees, and I take as a base assumption, that regardless of transitions of
power between political leaders and political parties a state’s foreign policy, dependent
on the inertia of entrenched interests, is largely consistent. The failure to enunciate policy
wishes was not an issue for current Russian President Vladimir Putin who formed his
policy prescriptions in the late 1990s.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its transition into 15 independent
nation-states of various sizes, ethnic make-ups, and political wills the modern Russian
Federation was born in turmoil. Current President Vladimir Putin described the fall of the
Soviet Union, and the subsequent transition, as “the major geopolitical disaster of the
century”. 4 Changes to political power centers, economic projections, physical borders
and demography, and the calculation of “Russian” national interest happened over the
course of years and against a backdrop of societal chaos.
In the U.S., the collapse of the Soviet Union was received with shock by
sovietologists, and for some, a world of possibility opened before them. This would be a
time in which America could at least share, by gloved hand or iron fist, the gifts that G-d
had bestowed on this new land, according to the American Protestant tradition of John

“Did Vladimir Putin Call the Breakup of the USSR 'the Greatest Geopolitical Tragedy
of the 20th Century?'.” @politifact. Accessed October 21, 2019.
https://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/mar/06/john-bolton/did-vladimirputin-call-breakup-ussr-greatest-geop/.
4

3

Winthrop. Preceding William Krystal and Robert Kagan’s “Project for the New
American Century”, that made early calls for a “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy and the
forced spread of democracy to Iraq, America’s intention to spread freedom and
democracy had already begun in the former Soviet bloc. 5 6 There have been mass
amounts of scholarship on the Iraq War project and the intentions of spreading
democracy to the Middle East that the Bush Administration professed, partially goaded
on by intellectuals like Kagan and Irving, in the modern era. However, the U.S.’
commitment to the spread of democracy has far deeper roots. American democracy
building has had dual philosophical underpinnings in American exceptionalism and the
ethical implications of liberal hegemony. This phenomenon has, at times, been lauded by
the left and right wings of congress for ostensibly different reasons. As such, we’ll
explore these philosophical routes beginning with the theology of American
exceptionalism provided by John Winthrop aboard the Arbella in 1630. 7 Next, we’ll
consider liberal hegemony and a philosophy of inalienable human rights in President
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points address and its mirror in CIA Director Robert Gate’s
invocation of the Monroe Doctrine and security theory of democratization.

5

Welcome to the Project for the New American Century. Accessed April 21, 2020.
https://web.archive.org/web/20130112203305/http://www.newamericancentury.org/.
6

Ibid

Furey, Constance M. “Theologies of American Exceptionalism: Winthrop and Cavell.”
The Immanent Frame, February 17, 2017. https://tif.ssrc.org/2017/02/13/winthrop-andcavell/.
7

4

Finally, President George W. Bush’s own Bush Doctrine and support for democracy
building will close our historical review of the philosophical underpinnings and, more-orless contemporary, manifestations of American democracy building.
In her analysis of U.S.-led legal reformation movements, Cynthia Alkon
describes a “cookie-cutter syndrome” at work in the reformation of post-communist legal
systems. Roughly stated, consultants and academics assume a perfect model of their own
legal system and recommend simply establishing it in these post-communist countries. 8
We will briefly address Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington whose conceptions of
democratization, I believe, fall into this cookie cutter trap. Finally, as a key project of this
paper, relying heavily on Larry Diamond’s The Spirit of Democracy I’ll build our
theoretical model with which to compare the historical record. This model will
necessarily include Diamond’s consideration of enforced democracies, the role of
economics in democratization, and the value of a “history of democracy” in the state
undergoing a democratizing project. 9
In Critique of the Goethe Program Marx, addressed the imagined phenomenon of
a new socialist system “just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every

8

Alkon, Cynthia. "The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under PostCommunist Democratization Programs." J. Disp. Resol. (2002): 327.
9

Diamond, Larry. The Spirit of Democracy the Struggle to Build Free Societies
throughout the World. Brantford, Ont.: W. Ross MacDonald School Resource Services
Library, 2013.
5

respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the
old society from whose womb it emerges.” 10
In other words, the new society is necessarily impacted by and, in part, made up
of the previous historical movement. In discussing the transition from the Soviet System
to the anarchy of the mid-1990s in Russia and then to the modern Russian Federation,
we’ll consider “birthmarks of the old society”. In the case of the development of Russia
as a modern state these birthmarks are a retarded history of democratization efforts,
historical events cemented in the Russian political consciousness, and pre-modern
political organizations that reflect the geographic necessity of development on the Asian
Steppe.
Finally, we’ll address the empirical question: What were U.S. efforts in Russia
from 1989 to 2004, successful or unsuccessful. It is ultimately my goal to outline the
governing premises of U.S. democratization efforts in Russia from 1989 to 2004 by first
describing those efforts in their historical context. Then we’ll compare them to
theoretical models of democratization and develop a theoretical framework for
appreciating why the U.S. acted in the way it did. As well as the implicit goals of the
programs the U.S. actually adopted and attempted to implement in Russia.

10

Marx, Karl. Critique of the Gotha program. Wildside Press LLC, 2008.
6

CHAPTER TWO: THE PHILOSPHICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY BUILDING EFFORTS
In 1630 aboard the Arbella, Minister John Winthrop delivered A Modell of
Christian Charity. A sermon to his band of pilgrims about their future settlement in the
new world. This sermon, I would argue, is the foundational text of a uniquely American
religion. Winthrop does two things in his address to the prospective settlers. First, he
describes the position of this new land and of the settlers and himself. They are, to
Winthrop, in a position of divinely granted superiority and hold an immense
responsibility. For Winthrop, there are two groups, divinely ordained, as the rich in spirit,
wealth, and potential, and the poor. 11 That gap cannot be eliminated but it must not grow
so wide that it irrevocably divides society into warring groups dividing the wholeness of
the body of Christ enmeshed in every person. The duty for the rich and their posterity is
to give and govern justly; “in exercising his graces in them, as in the great [sic] ones,
their love, mercy, gentleness, and temperance” says Winthrop. 12 He also famously closes
his sermon, clearly setting himself and his followers among those who can only be
described as rich saying,

11

Winthrop, John. "A modell of Christian charity (1630)." Collections of the
Massachusetts Historical Society 7 (1838): 47.
12

Ibid
7

“For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The eies of all
people are uppon us. Soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our God in this worke
wee haue undertaken, and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us,
wee shall be made a story and a by-word through the world.” 13
For Winthrop, and Americans who shared in this theology and labored under the same
Calvinist G-d, the U.S. and its people are special among nations and must bear the
responsibility that entails or face divine wrath. This thesis provided a theological
foundation for American expansion and when, after great effort and bloodshed, the
country reached from shore to shore the national identity acquired a second pillar, the
civic religion of inalienable rights and liberal hegemony. Or perhaps one could say that
for non-believers Winthrop’s theology of exceptionalism assumed the shape of a civic
religion. At the same time Exceptionalism transformed from what H.W. Brand calls
“exemplarism,” whereby the U.S. is distinct from Old World Politics and is a model for
their rebirth, to “vindicationalism” which shares Winthrop’s city on a hill identity but
must act to spread its universal political values.
This universal “vindicationalism”, I must be clear, was not always present. John
Quincy Adams once said, ““America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.
She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and
vindicator only of her own.” and although it is stretch to say America had any more than
an isolationist streak this was a potential branching point from a

13

Winthrop, John. "A modell of Christian charity (1630)." Collections of the
Massachusetts Historical Society 7 (1838): 47.
8

Jacksonian foreign policy. 14A Jacksonian foreign policy being a term coined by Walter
Russel Mead in his 2002 book, as a foreign policy characterized by, “ inward looking,
shunned international engagement, but prepared to aggressively defend US national
security if the country was threatened.” 15 This is the transition from Winthrop’s
conception of America to President Bush and the modern American crusade for human
rights. 16
In 2018, in The Great Delusion John Mearsheimer offers a critique of Liberalism
as a theory of international relations and tool for developing foreign policy.

17

The heart

of his critique is that liberal regimes, especially liberal hegemons where intent is paired
with capability, have a core attachment to, and belief in, inalienable human rights.
Predominantly in the twentieth century, other states have violated what U.S. liberal
democratic regime considers fundamental inalienable human rights. At which point our
regime has a moral duty to intervene through any means necessary to cease the violation
of fundamental human rights, although it should be clear and Mearsheimer does not make
it so, that U.S. government interventions, especially those predicated on force are

“America's Last Crusade.” RealClearPolitics. Accessed April 21, 2020.
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/25/americas_last_crusade_115563.ht
ml.
14

15

Mead, Walter Russell. SPECIAL PROVIDENCE: American Foreign Policy and How It
Changed the World. S.l.: ROUTLEDGE, 2018.
16

Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and
Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy." International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 112-56.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137499.
17

Mearsheimer, John J. GREAT DELUSION: Liberal Dreams and International
Realities. S.l.: YALE UNIV PRESS, 2019.
9

extremely divisive amongst self-described liberals. In addition, liberal theorists have
argued that liberal democracies are less likely to, indeed virtually never, fight with each
other and respect the human rights of their citizens. One such example was Maoz and
Russet in their 1993 paper Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace 1946 –
1986, predicated on theoretical works like Thomas Paine’s Common Sense and Immanuel
Kant’s Perpetual Peace. 18 This, for Mearsheimer, leads to a pattern of behavior present
in U.S. foreign policy whereby we merged a concern for human rights and security
concerns to justify a policy of intervention. This belief in inalienable human rights has
been critiqued by other realist scholars namely George Kennan.
In 1985, George Kennan readdressed his original critique of the moralistic
tendencies present in U.S. foreign policy especially during the period of the cold war he
studied. 19 In Morality and Foreign Policy, Kennan argued,
“Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests
of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual
elements of that society may experience.” 20
The government can’t be driven by the morality of the individual agents who make up the
bureaucratic, executive, or legislative arms of the government but, as no internationally
recognized system of morality exists, nor can it rely on any other universal system. The

18

Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. "Normative and structural causes of democratic peace,
1946–1986." American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 624-638.
19

Kennan, George Frost. American Diplomacy: 1900-1950.University of Chicago press:
New Amer Library, 1985.
20

Kennan, George F. "Morality and foreign policy." Foreign Affairs 64, no. 2 (1985):
205-218.
10

moral tendency that Mearsheimer identifies as driving Liberal interventionalist policy is
condemned by Kennan as the illegitimate addition of a moral position to a fundamentally
amoral process: foreign policy. Regardless of Kennan’s condemnation of it or the outputs
of this pervasive moral tendency identified by Mearsheimer, the tendency exists and
when merged with conceptions of “national interest” it is a strong incentive for a U.S.
foreign policy project concerned with spreading freedom and democracy to all of the
states controlled by the “bad guys” of the world.
These two rationales, and a moral drive to set the world right, for the duty of the
U.S. has guided our democratization efforts as long as we have had them. Strongly
present in the William Krystal, the Neo-conservative movement, and The Moral
Majority, is a conception of America unique in privilege, and responsibility, to spread
freedom and democracy where possible. 21 This responsibility is, in part, to secure the
safety of the U.S.; but, also because democracy is a good in and of itself. Although,
according to scholar Wendy Brown in her 2006 article, Krystal’s democracy mission is
out of a contempt for a truly democratic society in favor of one in which state power is
used punitively for moral agendas. 22 Additionally, because, as is stressed by right-wing
interpreters of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War,

21

Welcome to the Project for the New American Century. Accessed April 21, 2020.
https://web.archive.org/web/20130112203305/http://www.newamericancentury.org/.
22

Brown, Wendy. "American nightmare: Neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and dedemocratization." Political theory 34, no. 6 (2006): 690-714.
11

“the strong do what they can, and the weak endure what they must.'' 23 The second
conception, of an America that spreads democracy for the safety and preservation of the
rights of others has held more sway with the ideological camp of the American “Left”. A
seminal statement is embedded in the liberal, but racist, President Woodrow Wilson’s 14
points justifying US entry into World War I.
In an address to the U.S. Congress at the close of World War I, President
Woodrow Wilson lauded his 14 points outlining the ultimate aims of the war efforts. The
majority of Wilson’s points from the adjudication of colonial claims, rejection of the
“right of conquest”, and the freedom of trade, navigation, and sovereignty granted to
post-colonial nations as well as the nations of Russia, Poland, Belgium, and France,
whose territorial claims had shifted with the outcomes of the war, are indicative of the
duties of democratization and liberalization described by Mearsheimer. For Wilson there
can be no question that peace is achievable but not when illiberal regimes refuse to make
amicable agreements with their citizens and the rest of the world. The Bretton Woods
system, the United Nations, and the Universal System of Freedom of Navigation on the
seas guaranteed by the U.S. is an attempt to arbitrate the world’s problems to avoid
seeing those problems wash up on their shores the way the British, Spanish, and Japanese
did before. The conception of liberal democratization efforts, born not out of a belief in
human rights but in an attempt to make the world safer for American capitalism has been
a persistent theme of US policy for over a century

23

Thucydides, and Charles Forster Smith. History of the Peloponnesian War. Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 2006.
12

President Reagan’s CIA Director Robert Gates was called to testify as a part of
the Iran-Contra investigation in congress where he said to end U.S. intervention in
Nicaragua would be “totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine”. 24 The U.S. not only
could intervene in the western hemisphere but should to spread freedom and democracy
as a safety measure. President George w. Bush took this notion just a step further in what
has been called “national security liberalism” by Tony Smith in his 2000 article. 25 Yes,
America should spread freedom and democracy in vital areas to ensure national security
but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term “vital areas” became a lot more
pliable.
At the 20th Anniversary party for the National Endowment for Democracy
President G.W. Bush made a statement that laid bare the logic of national security
liberalism. First saying, “As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the
advance of freedom leads to peace” President Bush drew a direct cause and effect
between the spread of democracy, at any cost, to the security and stability of the U.S. 26

24

Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993. New York, NY:
Hill and Wang, 1994.
Smith, Tony. “National Security Liberalism and American Foreign Policy.” Oxford
Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed April 21, 2020.
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199240973.001.0001/acprof9780199240975-chapter-4.
25

“Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for
Democracy”. White House press release, November 6, 2003.
26
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According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, the early 2000s were “ a moment of
opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe” thanks to the position of
unrivaled primacy afforded to the U.S. 27
I must stress that an analysis of the history of American philosophical conceptions
of democracy and democratization, while useful for our purposes, is a predisposition.
There, is and was, a tendency among foreign policy scholars to assume the confluence of
cultural and international relations systems, like Lapid and Kratochwil do in their 1996
article. 28 Russian political system was synonymous with Russian cultural figures like
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, writing tangentially to political subjects like notions of freedom
and duty to the state. 29 This proved inefficient at predicting policy decisions. I want to
say that while this philosophical history lends a predisposition to American foreign policy
officials educated on a particular cannon this is not a deterministic force.

27

United States. 2002. The national security strategy of the United States of America.
[Washington]: President of the U.S.
Rengger, N. J. “The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory Yosef Lapid and
Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996, Pp. Viii, 255: Canadian
Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne De Science Politique.” Cambridge Core.
Cambridge University Press, November 10, 2009.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-political-science-revuecanadienne-de-science-politique/article/the-return-of-culture-and-identity-in-irtheorylapidyosef-and-kratochwilfriedrich-v-eds-boulder-lynne-rienner-1996-pp-viii255/D59562B50776C2C52EB37D410DC3C1C6.
28

29

Feng, Huiyun. "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy." In Oxford Research
Encyclopedia of Politics. 2017.
14

CHAPTER THREE: A HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S DISPOSITION TOWARDS
DEMOCRACY
This predisposition is manifest in the history, bureaucratic structures, and alliance
patterns that make up the U.S.’ path as I described earlier. Having discussed the historycreated predisposition affecting a U.S. conception of democracy and democratization,
however, we should describe the formation of an alternative path in Russian political, and
social history.
The historical trajectory of Russian political development is marked by transitions
towards democracy followed by harsh contractions when those democratic movements
threaten some elite group. This expansion and contraction is mirrored in England and
France’s own histories but the key difference is that Russia’s democratic expansion failed
to secure democratic rights until much later and their political system was primarily
tempered by the Mongol invasion and rule rather than the enlightenment and
development of a liberal conception of human rights and the duties of a state. This
historical trajectory is described best in terms of art, culture, philosophy, and political
development by James Billington in The Icon and the Axe.

15
For 200 years, proto-Russian communities and villages paid tribute to the Mongol
Empire with taxes collected by the Russian princes who were allowed political rule so
long as tribute was kept. 30 This period of Mongol rule served to sever Russia from the
historical development of Western Europe while leading to the implementation of several
new systems of government including a postal system, census, tax collection system, and
the expansion of capital punishment, once only applicable to serfs became universal as a
punishment and torture was integrated into the judicial system. 31 Historians, like
Billington, have argued the degree to which this period influenced Russian political
development, but this period does serve, uncontrovertibly, as the foundation for a
conception of a sovereign whose duty is solely to provide security without an expansive
conception of the rights of citizens
Contrary to this conception of absolute power ensconced in the sovereign; the
“obshchina,” a system of communal ownership that preceded serfdom, and followed it
until the collectivization of agriculture under the Stalin administration, existed in rural
communities across Eurasia and Eastern Europe. As described by Alexander Chuprov,
free peasants – in later centuries following the imposition of serfdom – serfs too (often
the descendants of free peasants) formed villages where land was allocated to males
forming new family units who didn’t inherit land as the eldest son. This allocation was

30

Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: an Interpretative History of Russian
Culture. New York: Vintage Books, 1970.
31

Vernadsky, George. (1970). The Mongols and Russia. A History of Russia, Vol. III.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
16

carried out by a primitive government made up of the eldest member of each family unit
which would mark and distribute new land to new families on the basis that they would
provide for the common welfare of the “obshchina.” Jovan E. Howe explains,
"The economic relations so established are essentially distributive: through
various categories of exchanges of both products and labor, temporary imbalances
such as those occasioned by insufficient labor power of a newly-established
family unit or a catastrophic loss, which places one unit at an unfair reproductive
disadvantage in relation to its allies, are evened out.” 32

Family, of course, being defined by Patrilineal relations and distinguished from the
previous household by a formal request to build a new family farm. This primitive
government would also elect a village leader called a “starosta” and a tax collector. As
Howe, argues in their book The Peasant Mode of Production, the obshchina developed as
a means of practicality to ensure the equitable distribution of land and tax burden in the
harsh Asian steppe.
These two systems are the foundations of different political ideologies, one a
proto-democratic structure in line with the example of the “commons” described by so
many economists and political scientists and the other an unabridged monarchy without
constraints, acting as the representative of the nation to the world, and of G-d in the
nation. The struggle between these ideas played out, Billington notes, again and again
throughout Russian history.
First during the reign of Catherine (the Great), Russia had been going through
some democratic reformations since the times of troubles, a period of instability after the

32

Howe, Jovan E. "The peasant mode of production." Publications of the Department of
Folk Tradition 15 (1991).
17

end of the line of Rurik the first monarch of the Kievan Rus. Peter (the Great) was
vaunted to Tsardom and implemented westernizing reforms in the Russian court most
importantly building the new capital of St. Petersburg, establishing the Russian navy, and
emancipating the serfs owned by the Russian Orthodox Church. These reforms continued
until Catherine, who saw the violence of the French revolution, cracked down specifically
on the expansion of democratic reforms. She went so far as to repeal the specific
provision passed by Tsar Peter and reinstated serfdom for those serfs previously owned
by the Church. 33 Repeating this pattern, Tsar Alexander II (The Great Emancipator)
ended the institution of serfdom universally. 34 Tsar Alexander III and Tsar Nicholas II,
following Tsar Alexander II, engaged in nationalizing campaigns finalizing the
suppression of separatist movements and purging Swedish and German cultural
influences from Russian government and society. In the case of Tsar Nicholas II (The
Bloody) regressive political reform went hand in hand with repression in the form of
nationalist pogroms, waves of systemic violence against Russian and Eastern European
Jews, and the Bloody Sunday massacre. Although Nicholas eventually gave into demands
for reform and created the Duma, the Russian parliament, distinct from the previous
Boyar duma which was an aristocratic advisory council to the tsar, their relationship was
very poor. The Duma in 1906, one year after its seating, authored “An Address to the
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Throne” demanding universal suffrage and the expulsion of ministers in favor of those
selected by the Duma.
Domestically, the “birthmarks” of the Russian society before the Soviet Union,
seem diametrically opposed to democratization, according to Seymour Lipset’s
conception of “tendency towards democracy” which we will address later. Having a low
literacy rate, a closed social hierarchy, low GNP per capita, and voluntary community
participation hampered by geography and climate. With the exception of the institution of
the obshchina that seems to be prima facia democratic and communitarian with regard to
the rights of the individual and the needs of the community. Regardless they did
democratize but that democratic expansion has historically crashed against elite
institutions and groups without the resolution the democratic expansions of England and
France underwent.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PREVIOUS THEORETICAL MODELS OF
DEMOCRATIZATION
There are existing theories of democratization that posit alternatives, realistic or
otherwise, about how a nation should encourage democratization and what the role of a
third party, in our case the U.S., should be. As I mentioned previously, the two, we’ll
contend with are Samuel Huntington’s “Waves of Democracy” thesis and Francis
Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis. However, I’ll first define democratization in order
to center a definition in our minds and to better understand what a democratic transition
should look like in summation. For our purposes we’ll use Enrique Baloyra’s definition:
“a process of political change initiated by the deterioration of an authoritarian
regime involving intense political context among actors competing to implement
policies grounded on different; even mutually exclusive, conceptions of the
government, regime, and the state; this conflict is resolved by the breakdown of
that regime leading to the installation of a government committed to the
inauguration of a democratic regime and/or the installation of a popularly elected
government committed to the inauguration of a democratic regime.” 35
This definition has some necessary and sufficient conditions including: the deterioration
of an authoritarian regime, internal political conflict over conceptions of government, and
the ushering in of a democratic regime or a popular government committed to
establishing a democratic regime. As we’ll see however, Fukuyama and Huntington’s
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theories of this process don’t really contend with this definition or address the role states
should play in it. Their theories are far more concerned with historical progression and
the perceived ties between democratic and economic reform.
Francis Fukuyama characterized the fall of the Soviet Union and its historical
moment as the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western Liberalism.”
36

In other words Fukuyama says that democracy is “the only game in town” Fukuyama

makes two claims for his theory of democratization: 1) As stated above, there are no
alternatives (not in any major population group or nation anyway) and 2) These
alternative systems have not re-sprouted because their ideas have been so thoroughly
rebutted. 37 38 39 This is of course a modern example of what scholars of democratization
call modernization theory. The idea that the positive outcomes of economic expansion
and success are tied, and coterminous, with democratic ones is seen as a means for
promoting democratization. Additionally, states making serious attempts at democratic
transitions are still precarious if they fail, coincidentally, to achieve some economic
success, thus a successful, assumed capitalist, economy is a necessity for sustainable
democratic change. This method of democratization is justified a little differently in
Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratization in the 20th Century; who argues
states have little to no effect or reason to drive a particular model of democratization
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because, in this case, there is a historical progression taking place that has produced
democracies in very unlikely places.
In a very short summary, Huntington analyzes the proliferation of democratic
regimes from 1922 to about the 1990s and notices drastic fluctuations in the number of
democracies. He determines there must be “waves” of democratization as opposed to the
slow and steady march of democracy. Huntington argues that there are four potential
explanations for these waves; 1) Single Cause, 2) Parallel Development, 3) Snowballing,
and 4) Prevailing Nostrum. These explanations may explain particular waves of
democratization; e.g. the third wave of democratization (from 1974 - undetermined) was
provoked by the single cause of the oil shock-based economic collapse of the 1970s.
Huntington’s theory describes both democratization and what he calls “reverse waves”
which are historical patterns that explain failed democratization; waves of democratic
expansion follow contractions. Contractions, not only, in the number of states who are
democratic; but, how “democratic” these states really are in comparison to past
democratic states and administrations.
The common theme of Huntington, and Fukuyama’s works, are that
democratization is a natural phenomenon; simply the way of the world. For these
theories, democracy is a particular phenomenon, with backstops and eddies, but the best
possible response is to allow for its development and promote other policy priorities that
can be guaranteed. For Fukuyama, those other policy priorities can be, and are,
coterminous with positive democratic outcomes. With Huntington, democracy follows
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this expansion and contraction pattern but the states who have adopted democracy, he
admits, don’t seem to fit any sort of empirical pattern that could influence policy
positions besides exclaiming your support for democracy.
Cynthia Alkon, in analyzing legal reform in post-communist states, writes about
the tendency of the programs she studied to fall into “cookie cutter syndrome.” 40 This is
the way in which western reformers treat nations as dough the “Western Liberal” cookie
shape is pushed on to. If the cookie shape is followed, the rule of law, democratization,
and reform will inevitably follow. For Fukuyama, that “cookie shape” is this updated
modernization theory; where positive output A is directly correlated, and causative, with
positive output B. States should pursue the proliferation of free market economics and the
British legal tradition because democratization goes directly in hand with these other
positive outputs. 41 The direct inputs in the form of expansion of legal traditions and
capitalist economic policies, which can be directly controlled and implemented, lead to
the positive outputs of the establishment and maintenance of these capitalist institutions
and “democracy” which is so often measured by economic freedom, like in the CATO
Institute’s Human Freedom Index. For Huntington, there are historic factors at play that
have birthed democracy in the most unlikely of places regardless of the perceived
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receptiveness of international and domestic actors to democracy. There is simply nothing
to do but further analyze the waves of democratic transitions and either expand the theory
into an explanatory position or wait for the next democratic wave after the current
democratic crunch.42 43 Huntington’s theory clearly does not drive U.S. democratization
nor is it particularly useful for understanding democratization as a process promoted by
great powers. China, Iran, and Singapore clearly disagree about the viability of
alternatives to western liberal democracy and they do not support democratization in any
meaningful sense of the word. 44 Huntington’s work is self admittedly weak theoretically;
succeeding only in analyzing specific historical moments, and even then it is unable to
explain some specific democratic transitions or backslides. 45 For all of these reasons, we
will build a theory of democratization complementary to Baloyra’s definition that will
analyze democracies not natural phenomena but as process to be driven as the U.S. has
attempted since the beginning of its imperial age.
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CHAPTER FIVE: A NEW THEORETICAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION
In 1959, Seymour Lipset published one of the most cited papers in the history of
the American Political Science Review titled Some Requisites for Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy. 46 In this piece, which was revisited by the author
in later years but remained largely unchanged in its theory, Lipset lays out what he
considers some necessary factors for democracy and outlines the effect each factor will
have on civil society. He closes his piece with this helpful diagram (Table 1).
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This model serves as the basis of my own. In his 1993 speech, Lipset revisited the
dearth of responsibility that he laid, in his original article, on economic factors in
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democratization. 48 This was because Huntington’s Third Wave had gained prominence
and the historical record no longer supported democracy as an exclusively Western
phenomenon with the decolonization of Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia
whose new states largely became democracies despite their poor economic fortunes. 49
With poor states, like Namibia and Lesotho becoming, and maintaining their democratic
status, wealthy, relative to their neighbors, capitalist states like Brazil slipping out of
democracy status. 50 51 The scholars who tend to challenge the view that affluence and a
market economy are conditions of democratization have, in my judgment, the more
persuasive arguments. In his article, analyzing the relationship between economic success
and democratic political regimes, Adam Przeworski concludes, “In the end, there is not a
single reason to sacrifice democracy at the altar of development.” 52 Secondly, I have cut
the “additional consequences” portion of Lipset’s diagram in my own model simply

48

Lipset, Seymour Martin. "The social requisites of democracy revisited." In Einigung
und Zerfall: Deutschland und Europa nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, pp. 287314. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1995.
Roser, Max. “Democracy.” Our World in Data, March 15, 2013.
https://ourworldindata.org/democracy.
49

Gwaambuka, Tatenda. “The Most Democratic Countries in Africa, 2018: The African
Exponent.” The African Exponent. The African Exponent, February 4, 2018.
https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8848-african-democracy-stagnant-anduninspiring.
50

Polimedio, Chayenne. “Brazilians Are Losing Faith in Democracy and Considering a
Return to Military Rule.” Vox. Vox, September 19, 2017.
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2017/9/19/16333360/brazilians-losing-faith-democracy.
51

52

Przeworski, Adam. "Democracy and economic development." Mansfield & R. Sisson
(Eds.), The evolution of political knowledge. democracy, autonomy, and conflict in
comparative and international politics (2004): 300-324.
26

because it isn’t particularly useful for my project. This paper is not an attempt to describe
the consequences of the implementation of a democratic regime but solely the ways in
which states attempt to do so externally. However, I do not have any reason to disagree
with, or discount, what Lipset identifies as additional consequences.
Lipset is primarily concerned with the domestic factors that influence and help
democratic actors build democratic regimes, and the institutions they rely upon. As such,
before discussing the ways in which a foreign power can lean on internal forces in
support of democratic reform, we should discuss the extant internal forces in support of,
and against, democratic reform in Russia. Lipset points to an open class system as having
a positive effect on democratic reform. Of course, for much of Russia’s history their
class system with stringent delineations between the boyars (aristocratic class),
merchants, and the peasant or serf class. After industrialization a certain percentage of the
Russian populous moved to the industrial centers of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and
Novgorod forming an industrial working class parallel to the rural serf class. Today, this
stringent class system has been shifted with oligarchs taking the role of the landed
aristocracy and the average Russian citizen certainly doing far better than their serf
compatriots but still marked as a lower class of Russian. 53
Lipset also points to a nation’s economic resources and the social safety net it can
support as useful for democratization. According to Paul Kennedy, Russia’s gross
national product (GNP) was relatively high through the 1800s but fell behind Germany,
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France, and Britain as they underwent industrialization. 54 Additionally, in Christopher
Clark’s Sleepwalkers, he remarks on the value of the French state’s lending policies to
Russia.55 Clark argues that much of Russia’s foreign policy in Eastern Europe at the time
was dependent on free-flowing French state-backed loans. Today, Russian GDP lags
behind most of the rest of the industrial world and is more in line with Middle Eastern
states whose economic activity is almost exclusively based on oil production. 56
According to Lipset, the expansion of democratic reforms, key among them
voting, is dependent on the ability of the populous to read, understand, and respond to a
ballot because the orchestration of thousands or hundreds of thousands of in-person votes
is nigh on impossible. Russia’s literacy rate in the early 1900s was relatively low until the
Likbez literacy program implemented shortly after the 1917 revolution. 57 In the 1990s
and today, Russia’s literacy rate is on par with the rest of the industrialized world at
around 99%. 58
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Later well discuss the implementation of democratic reforms in Russia and the
key prevalence of elections and the working model of democratization, described within
the text of the U.S. policy, that places elections as they key to democratic reforms. I want
to stress that elections do not a democracy make. John Dewey delineates the multitude of
systems and requirements that make an actual democracy a democracy. 59 Universal
suffrage, an independent judiciary, the ability to choose between competing conceptions
of governance, etc. As we’ll see the U.S. democracy programs implemented in Russia did
not take this same approach towards a serious and long-term implementation of “thick”
democracy.
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CHAPTER SIX: DIAMOND AND EISEN’S CONTRIBTUIONS TO A
THEORETICAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION
Lipset’s work, and diagram, outlines the internal mechanisms that help establish
and maintain democracy. Larry Diamond, in The Spirit of Democracy, argues for the
necessity of some international mechanisms for building and establishing democracy.
Likewise, in November 2019, Norman Eisen et. Al. and the Brookings Institute produced
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding with their
own set of prescribed actions for nations and other international actors who are looking to
establish and promote democracy. Diamond and Eisen agree on some of these prescribed
actions and they diverge sharply on another. Diamond and Eisen agree on the efficacy of
applying peaceful pressure with sufficient linkages and leverage; supporting democratic
actors both nationally and internationally; granting institutional access when appropriate
to create a normative standard; and rewarding democratization with conditional funding.
Their disagreement on the use of force is telling and will be discussed later but
Diamond’s lens of analysis, studying democratic transitions the world over, led to a
particular perspective on the use of force using key successful cases in Germany and
Japan and key unsuccessful ones like Haiti. Eisen and his colleague’s view omits the use
of force specifically because their area of interpretation is solely based on Eastern Europe
where massive displays of force would be a massive destabilizing force.
30

Additionally, Eisen et. Al have no perspective on liberation technology which
Diamond talks about, again I think this is due to their geographic perspective with most
of Eastern Europe having a level of technological integration that parts of the Middle
East, South East Asia, and Africa simply don’t. I have combined their theoretical models
and prescribed actions to develop the following diagram. (Table 2)

According to Diamond and Eisen, states that are seeking to support and build
democracies abroad should understand and engage in pressure, provide support for
democratic actors, and leverage conditional funding. Diamond, exclusively, argues for
the national support of liberation technology; and Eisen et. Al. propose the extension of
institutional access. Only on the matter of “force” do Diamond and Eisen potentially
disagree and exploring all these tools in greater depth can help us flesh out our theoretical
model.
31

I should be clear that the external mechanisms, as I define them, are the tools available to
third-party states to further a democratization process. States can and have democratized
without external support in these aforementioned forms.
First, there is a distinction in this literature between pressure and force. Here
pressure excludes all non-covert or overt militarized actions in defense of a democratic
regime; or, in the overthrow of a non-democratic regime. 60 Eisen and his colleagues hold
that there is a value to all kinds and intensities of pressure, depending on the
circumstances, but they don’t speak to the use of force in terms of democracy production.
This might be, as I said, because their case study and rules are highly focused on Europe
today but nevertheless, they don’t comment. Diamond, in contrast, talks about the
concept of “democratization by force” as a last resort open to states. 61 The oft repeated
lessons of Germany and Japan post-WWII, Diamond says, offer very little as narratives
counter to U.S. democratization efforts in Grenada, Haiti, and Iraq. What was the
difference? Two things; Diamond says that the total destruction of Germany and Japan
and the overwhelming international support, in the Western World, for the U.S. 's
rebuilding mission make Germany and Japan fundamentally different from the other
three cases. 62 Without saying anything about efficiency or efficacy, we can say there is
some historic basis for the validity of force as a last-ditch effort to build democracy.
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Differentiating between pressure and force, Diamond and Eisen agree on the
efficacy of pressure. As I said, pressure is all actions including covert or overt military
action. Measures could extend from President Carter’s “name &shame” campaign
through a wide range of economic incentives and sanctions to outright invasion and
occupation. Diamond stresses that “leverage” and “linkage”, two terms from Stephen
Levitsky and Lucan Way, affect the efficacy of pressure. 63 “Leverage” is the power to
affect the economic and material conditions of a given authoritarian country’s
constituencies as well as the power the authoritarian countries leverage against the
democratizing power’s constituencies. 64 For example, the reliance of western nations on
Middle Eastern oil supplies severely diminishes western powers’ relative “leverage”. 65
Linkages are the material, political, or social connections between either 1) an
authoritarian state and groups within the state or external actors promoting
democratization or 2) a coalition of democratizing states. The stronger a connection
between an authoritarian state and democratizing states the stronger the effects of
peaceful pressure. Secondly, the stronger the ties between a coalition of democratizing
states the less chance of defection within that coalition and thus the greater collective
effect of democratizing states. It is also important that states signal their leverage and
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their resolve. In The Democracy Playbook, Eisen argues the U.S. and other western
powers should signal clearly that they will react robustly to democratic rollbacks, human
rights abuses, censoring of the media, restricting the autonomy of universities, or
hampering judicial independence. 66 Eisen argues that having leverage is insufficient
unless a state is willing to state it outright, outline the steps which will be rewarded and
those that will be punished and is actually committed to substantial rewards and severe
punishments as appropriate. With sufficient “linkages” and “leverage” Diamond and
Eisen agree, without condition, that states who seek to spread democracy could, and
should, do so through peaceful pressure.
Next, Eisen and Brookings, stress several prescribed actions that I’ve lumped into
support for national and international democratic actors. These can be actors within civil
society, independent investigative media, and domestic and international nongovernmental institutions (NGOs). 67 Diamond also stresses the need of supporting actors
like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). 68 Actors within civil society, like
bureaucrats and politicians, can be supported in creating and adopting any number of
liberalizing rules. For example, the European Union (EU) has a series of pre-ascension
rules designed to strengthen democracy and the rule of law by forcing civil society
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members, and ultimately states, to agree to, implement, and learn about any number of
structures and rules that are fundamentally pro-democracy. Independent media, especially
media located outside of the physical capital, can educate the population, carry narratives
that are pro-democracy, and expose the fallibility of the ruling regime which, according
to Lipset, is so incredibly dependent on external sources of legitimacy when it does not
yet possess the legitimacy provided through the consent of the governed. 69 70 Some
domestic and international NGOs support democracy and democratic actors. Doing so
while distributing necessary material needs can increase the linkage between
democratizing states and the constituents of the authoritarian state. Eisen is especially
concerned with promoting positive relations between NGOs and the central government
to counter the narrative that these two should always be diametrically opposed. 71 In
addition, Diamond encourages domestic support for state-operated democratization
efforts within democratizing states. Actors like the NED, Diamond notes, are unique and
flexible in supporting democratizing efforts. The NED, being made up of the National
Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Center for International
Enterprise, and the Solidarity Center, covers the largest U.S. domestic coalitions and can
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act in a variety of ways in support of democracy. 72 Again, Diamond and Eisen agree
support for domestic and international actors, both in democratizing states and in
authoritarian states, are key for supporting democratization efforts.
Acknowledging the limitations of sanctions and funding to drive behavior,
Diamond and Eisen both agree on tying conditional funding to democratization. Whether
you agree with Lipset, writing in 1956, that economic success is a key factor in
democratizing in the first place or you think that there is some level of coincidence
between the relative economic success and the success of democracy in the U.S. and
Western Europe, there seems to be an overwhelming level of economic success amongst
states who support democracy abroad. 73 Diamond and Eisen argue that states with
financial power can use this leverage to shape and shove authoritarian states behavior
towards democracy. This ability is amplified when states act in concert like the
conditional extension of funding offered by the EU to states like Poland. Conditional
funding creates a normative standard of behavior among these authoritarian states
reinforcing democratization simply through their own bureaucratic habit, while also
potentially reinforcing democracy through the funding of institutions listed above. The
key to this mechanism is its conditionality. In recent years, Poland and Hungary have
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strained at the bonds of European society. 74 75 So far, the EU has not rescinded their
funding or status as full member states but instead has farmed the issue out to the
European Commission, with every passing day EU funding supports a new pattern of
increasingly illiberal behavior violating the presumed notion of conditionality.
Next, in the way that conditional funding creates an enforcement mechanism for
behavior through habit, institutional access enforces behavior through normative ideals
and standards. Eisen and Brookings specifically talk about access to institutions like the
European Court of Human Rights. Institutions like the court and others monitor and
produce reports on member states behavior. 76 While the Court of Human Rights and the
Council of Europe, contain states we can unequivocally call authoritarian they still,
produce reports that have two effects on normative standards. A poor report may hamper
a state’s influence within those organizations which the authoritarian state would find it
necessary to maintain not only to shield itself from blowback but to link itself to other
states to hamper a coalition forming against them. These institutions could also produce
reporting that creates a negative reputation. For states concerned with domestic and
international legitimacy, as well as normative ideas about themselves being constantly
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subjected to reputational decline and institutional criticism may, in the long term, affect
their willingness to change incrementally. 77 Especially when those changes are rewarded
with further institutional access and conditional funding.
Finally, there is one last lesson to be learned from two media organizations: AlJazeera and Al-Arabiyah. These two organizations disseminate some of the best on the
ground news for the Middle East and do so in English, Arabic, and other languages to an
international audience. They also allow “ ordinary Arabs [to] call in and voice their
unedited grievances live before 20 million viewers”. 78 While there has been a recent turn
in our opinions towards technology as a means of community organizing and general
good, Diamond argues there is sufficient evidence that on the whole it will turn out
positively. Between mobile communication, free video uploading, anonymity, ease of
access to liberation technology like cell phones and computers can, and have, helped
millions of online communities form around niche interests. In authoritarian countries
one of these communities can be those who are unhappy with the current regime and are
willing to work together to make their collective voices heard. Diamond stresses that
authoritarian states are very good, and getting better, at shutting down access to these
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platforms and this technology. 79 The last thing a state supporting democracy should do is
join them and must instead demonstrate a vibrant democracy with access to technology
and the freedom to criticize the government at home if they want to support democracy
abroad. 80
These issues and actions are highly interconnected. Their scope is not always
agreed upon and in the case of force there may be an outright disagreement. However,
scholars of democratization agree that there is a place for states to support democracy
abroad. While there are a multitude of ways one can work to support democracy abroad,
there some key actions that states and locations of states should do: apply peaceful
pressure with sufficient linkages and leverage; support democratic actors both nationally
and internationally; grant institutional access when appropriate to create a normative
standard; reward democratization with conditional funding; support the use and
dissemination of liberation technology; and if all else fails make the decision to support
democratization through force from the very ashes up or not at all because half measures,
as Diamond argues about the failed democratization efforts the U.S. underwent in Haiti
and Iraq, are twice as destructive. 81
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CHAPTER SEVEN: A HISTORY OF U.S. DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS IN
RUSSIA FROM 1989 TO 2004
The U.S. has a long and prolific foreign policy history in accordance with its
status as a rising, dominant, and eventually global power from the late 1790s onwards to
today. In 1991, the U.S. shifted its foreign policy concerns from the containment of
Soviet power to the possible consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet State. The
extraordinary shift in concerns inevitably had programmatic consequences. One
consequence was a set of programs designed to provide economic aid and assistance
including the provision of food, water, and medical care, carte blanche. A second set of
policy actions took the form of direct support and funding to democratization programs
akin to the ones we have been discussing. A third set of policies and actions don’t seem
directly akin to democratization but had an outsized effect on the process of Russian
political development in the 1990s. These latter two sets are our focus and I will in short
order explain the history behind and effects, both direct and indirect, of these actions. I
begin with the explicit democratization programs: the NED, the SEED act, and the
FREEDOM support act of 1992. Then I will discuss the policy decisions made by the
U.S. that, while being outside of the direct realm of democratization, had a significant
impact on Russian development namely Shock Therapy Economics and the events of the
1996 elections in Russia.
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In 1982, President Ronald Reagan, in a speech to the British parliament, proposed
a joint government program between the U.S. and their Western European allies that
would be explicitly aimed at promoting democracy abroad. 82 This program when
eventually created by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983 was the National
Endowment for Democracy (or NED). 83 The NED became a non-governmental 501C-3
centered in Washington D.C. with four constituent offices that account for half of its
budget, with the other half being awarded in grants to other programs abroad. These
offices are the American Center for Labor Solidarity (ACILS), the Center for
International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs (NDI), and International Republican Institute (IRI). Throughout the
1980s until the Obama administration, who briefly moved the funding into a separate
umbrella within the Stater Department, the NED was the main funding mechanism for
international democratization programs around the world. 84
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The NED receives funding annually from Congress and the Democracy Fund, as
an outlay of the State department budget. 85
The Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) act was a bundle of
legislation originally directed at Poland and Hungary but eventually expanded to the
countries of the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and other former socialist states. 86 This
legislation provided funding and education materials on agriculture, trade, investment,
and cultural and scientific expansion. This funding and material were based on a few
prerequisites including the removal of trade restrictions and the export of profits from
these countries to U.S. based foreign investors. These programs would, after their
establishment, support and fund burgeoning democratic institutions within their field.
Today, it must be remarked, the SEED act has had little to no affect at achieving market
or quality of life parity between Western Europe and much of the former socialist
republics with Hungary and Poland having some marked success but with significant help
from the European Union. 87
The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets
Support Act of 1992 or simply the FREEDOM Support Act was a democratization

85

Ibid

B., Dante, and Fascell. “Text - H.R.3402 - 101st Congress (1989-1990): Support for
East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989.” Congress.gov, November 28, 1989.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-bill/3402/text.
86

Henley, Jon. “30 Years after Communism, Eastern Europe Divided on Democracy's
Impact.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, October 15, 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/15/30-years-after-communism-easteuropeans-divided-over-democracys-impact.
87

42

program not fundamentally different from the one inscribed in the SEED act. The
FREEDOM Support act fostered democracy and viable political institutions through the
creation of American Business Centers (ABCs) that would operate in the developing
markets in Eastern Europe but most important provide for jobs in the U.S. by directing
U.S. business interests to invest in Eastern European resource markets. 88 Split between
the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, these ABCs would represent
the U.S.’s economic interests abroad, support drug eradication programs, and make
progress toward the implementation of democratic institutions and governance in these
countries. Critically, while the SEED act was targeted at specific states who were
arguably more western and more democratic the FREEDOM support act allowed the
President to place ABCs where he deemed they would be efficient and profitable and
could draw on the SEED fund to establish them.
The FREEDOM support act, the SEED act, and the NED act and its subsequent
institution, the National Endowment for Democracy, represented the body of direct U.S.
democratization efforts in Russia from 1989 to 2004; and until the Obama Administration
rerouted the funding of some of these programs through the U.S. democracy fund in his
first term. 89
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Although, this funding shift was reversed under the Trump Administration. 90 They do
not however, represent the end of the U.S.’s actions to spread democracy to Russia by all
means. The process of shock therapy economics, as well see directly, also was conceived
as an instrument of democratization. Also, the results and processes of the Russian
Presidential election and the influence of the Clinton administration had an outsized
effect on Russia’s democratic development, had an outsized impact on a Russian
conception of democratization.
The concept of shock therapy economics has been attributed to Milton Freidman
directly and to economist and professor Jeffrey Sachs who admittedly hated the term and
denied his specific use thereof. Regardless of its origin, shock therapy economics is the
process of removing price and currency controls, liberalizing trade practices, eliminating
state subsidies, and the large-scale privatization of formerly state-owned assets and doing
all of these things as close to instantaneously as possible. In theory, these planned shocks
would jump-start a nation’s economy, it was believed and argued, by releasing latent
entrepreneurial energy hitherto repressed by the state-run economy with its vast
regulatory structure and hostility to most or all forms of private enterprise. Critics say
this shock creates an unnecessary and dramatic rise in inequality and unemployment
where gradualism can address stagnation without these severe jumps. Regardless, Yegor
Gaidar, with the advice of the Washington consensus and economic advisor Jeffrey
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Sachs, instituted these shock therapy economic reforms during his time as prime minister
from June 1992 to December 1992.
The GINI coefficient rose around 9 points, Russia’s GDP contracted by 18% from
1990 to 1998, and the rates of suicide and alcoholism exploded in step with
unemployment and inflation during the same period. Joseph Stiglitz argues that the
implementation of these reforms during a moment of political crisis without a strong
government and institutionalized law created a race to the bottom “strip Russia for
capital” mentality where competition meant if newly private owners didn’t strip their
factories and physical capital someone else would forcibly take it from them and sell it
off later. 91 This mentality combined with the systemic under evaluation of state-owned
enterprises led to a collection of oligarchs today controlling entire industries in Russia.
There is no question as to the failure of the Russian shock therapy program; but,
why does Jeffrey Sachs argue it was necessary in the first place? In What I did in Russia,
he answers this very question. 92 Sachs first reminds us that he has helped implement
reform programs like this in Bolivia, in Russia, and in Poland. Sachs argues each of these
states faced the same problems: a failing government, a currency inflating into the
hundreds and thousands of percentage points, and productive stagnation. Sachs viewed
his role as fundamentally short term and advisory.
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In Poland, the shock therapy reforms were far less destructive and depending on
your analysis prepared Poland for its economic success today. Why didn’t this happen in
Russia? While Sachs agrees the problems facing Poland and Russia were the same, the
scale of these problems was not. While Poland required about $1 billion U.S. in direct
stabilizing funds Russia, says Sachs, would require around $5 billion U.S. in funds and
$15 billion U.S. in direct economic aid. Ultimately, Sachs argues the inability of the U.S.
and the international order to meet these funding levels and implement these reforms as
stringently as Bolivia and Poland did ultimately led to their failure. I think Sach’s
analysis requires some comparison though. In the 1960s and 1970s before implementing
the Deng reforms, China faced the same economic stagnation and monetary inflation.
President Deng Xiao-Ping and his predecessors engaged in a series of incremental
economic reforms that brought China’s GDP from 2.7% growth in the 1960s to 15.7%
growth in 2005. 93 Incrementalism produced a strong private sector, massive GDP
growth, and a GDP rivaling the U.S., although it coincided with the Chinese Communist
Party’s authoritarian hold on political power. In the midst of this crisis in Russia the
Presidential Elections, the first since the fall of the Soviet Union were held; and, left
something to be desired.
The results of the 1996 Russian election are relatively uncontentious in both the
Russian and American academies. American scholars and foreign policy officials confirm
that the Clinton administration offered funding, technical support,
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and advisors to Boris Yeltsin’s presidential campaign and helped Yeltsin achieve a slight
win against the latent Russian Communist Party in the first round and a 10 pt. or so lead
in the second. 94 The official Kremlin position on the outcome of the 1996 election is the
same. However, multiple opposition candidates, in a meeting with Dmitri Medvedev,
current prime minister and former president of Russia, argued that Medvedev was
adamant “Yeltsin had lost”. 95 Regardless, this event as the first real exercise of
democratic action in Russia on the federal executive level was marred by contention.
Unusual shifts in voting patterns in some of the more ethnically diverse Russian oblasts,
huge donations, the promised orchestration of a IMF bailout, the movement of President
Yeltsin from 8% in polling to winning with 54% of the vote coincide with a domestic
pattern of distrust in democratic outcomes and one of the least popular Russian leaders in
history. 96
These programs define the bulk of U.S. democratization efforts in Russia and
unfortunately, as we’ll see, they act counter to any academic model of democratization.
They also reveal a fundamental premise of American democratization: in the American
foreign policy apparatus, the promotion of laissez-faire capitalism and democracy are
deemed synonymous.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: COMPARING THE HISTORICAL RECORD TO THE
THEORETICAL MODEL AND CRITIQUE
A basic academic conception of a democratization model would advise a state
interested in spreading democracy abroad to invest in tools to apply pressure, provide
support for national and international democratic actors, be willing to apply force in some
instances, provide conditions for institutional access and developmental assistance, and
invest in the creation and distribution of liberation technology, whatever that means in
each historical context. The actions of the U.S. directly, or seemingly indirectly, in the
aid of democratization in Russia from 1989 to 2004 reflect a botched democratization
model that assumes that democratization is synonymous with the expansion of neo-liberal
capitalism and this is empirically present in the text and provisions of the legislative
actions and diplomatic actions that the U.S. undertook from 1989 until 2004 where the
U.S.-Russian relationship degraded beyond direct U.S. influence. It presumes, in the
model of Fukuyama’s conception of modernization theory, that the expansion of
capitalism as a positive outcome is hand in hand with other perceived positive outcomes
such as democratization. This model is, and at the time was, directly contradictory to any
sense of Russian path dependency which would not allow them to be sublimated into a
western international order dominated by the U.S.
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These policies and institutions include, as previously mentioned, the NED, the SEED act,
the FREEDOM support act, Shock Therapy economics, and the Clinton Administration’s
response to the 1996 Russian presidential election on behalf of former President Yeltsin.
The NED and its institutions are the only attempt, on our list, that seem to actively
fulfill some of the model of democratization we developed. Their funding expanded
support to democratic actors in Russia including youth activists, pollsters, election
monitors, and judicial opinion shops on campaign finance and election law. 97 They built
linkages and structures throughout Eastern Europe, most importantly including Russia, to
encourage the democratization of the entire swath of former socialist states.
Today Russia and several other Eastern European countries and other more
“authoritarian” states decry the NED and their programs as western expansionism and
invasive. I think however, broadly, that the NED is a legitimate attempt to support
democratic actors, expand labor rights, drive judicial reform towards impartial juridical
systems that are not inherently or necessarily based on the British legal tradition, and a
Liberal conception of civil liberties. Although, the NED, even as the most in line with a
model of democratization, is more logically sound and researched based, it has a specific
drive through the Center for International Private Enterprise to whose stated mission is,
“strengthening democracy around the globe through private enterprise and marketoriented reform” marking democratic reform and economic reform as at least dual
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projects. 98 The NED’s stand-alone position in actually supporting democratizing
programs and their position alongside other “democratizing” programs weakens their
ability to actually provide the support they intend to.
The SEED act explicitly excluded Russia and was aimed at extending capitalism
to former socialist states. Despite their mandate to promote democracy and the fostering
of democratic institutions the SEED act offered no way or funding to do so. Instead,
funding was directed at trade and investment, agricultural expansion, and private sector
development. Specifically, the SEED act provides for,
“(1) URGENT ACTION TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY- The scheduling of
democratic elections throughout Eastern Europe creates circumstances requiring a
prompt and skillful response, using immediately available resources, from U.S.
Government-funded agencies engaged in assisting in the development abroad of
democratic practice and institutions.” 99
as its first provision; followed by a slew of market reforms in in technical training, credit
union support, international trade, most favorable trade status, tax relationships,
restructuring of international debt, tourist and student exchanges, and ensuring access to
markets for American corporations. That funding was of course not predicated on
manifest efforts to build the institutional architecture of democracy nor was it predicated
on empirical signs of democratic governance or democratic institution building. Instead,
funding was based on the willingness to liberalize trade relationships, allow for direct,
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and indirect, foreign investment on the part of the U.S., and critically to allow the free
flow of capital in and out of the target countries. The U.S. model of democratization in
the case of the SEED act can be seen either as subordinating democratization to fostering
capitalist expansion or as presuming that democracy would spring automatically from the
conversion of a statist economy to one dominated by private actors. It calls for the
support of democratic institutions but funds economic institutions. It presses for very
early elections without consideration of the consequences of such elections for the
establishment of a real democratic government.
The FREEDOM Support act of 1992 was equally clear in its prescriptive
messaging. Again, the text of the bill provides a direct mission to ensure the fostering of
democratic institutions and democratic actors across Eastern Europe saying,
“(1) recent developments in Russia and the other independent states of the
former Soviet Union present an historic opportunity for a transition to
a peaceful and stable international order and the integration of the
independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of
democratic nations;
(2) the entire international community has a vital interest in the success
of this transition . . .” 100
This mission would be carried out by ABCs, acting on behalf of the U.S. Commerce
Department to establish American business branches in Russia and Eastern Europe and
provide for domestic American jobs, through local market investment. One could argue
that these ABCs were an attempt to build linkages and apply pressure in Russia.
However, the nature of the development of these ABCs, at the discretion of the American
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President would not allow for sufficient linkages between ABCs and Russia to have any
real effect on the Russian domestic environment. They didn’t hire local Russians, they’re
actions in the resource markets of Russia were, throughout the 1990s, primarily market
shorts, where investors buy market instruments that accrue value as the market – or
segments thereof – collapse; making money off the failures of the Russian market, and
they had no proven connections or mission to interact with domestic governments and
non-governmental actors. Their perception, and perceived failure, to pursue the interests
of anyone other than the American Business community was documented by Prof. A. V.
Yurchernenko in his 2018 article. 101 He argues persuasively that the ABCs built in
Russia rejected the advice of both Russian and U.S. economists and in some cases
directly denied these economic researchers and advisors from studying the businesses
themselves. Additionally, when these ABCs did make internal or external policy
decisions they were in line with the economic theories and prescriptions of the U.S.
Commerce Department. 102
The SEED act, the FREEDOM support act, and the program of shock therapy
economics recommended by the Washington consensus are expressly economic programs
shaped by a political agenda. Programs designed to expand a uniquely American neoliberal capitalism to Russia and the former soviet republics, because, in an American
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Libertarian conception the market is synonymous with democracy. All these programs
were commissioned with spreading democracy and supporting democratic actors and
democratic institutions but were provided with the tools to spread American economic
interests.
Scholars argue that conditional funding can encourage democratization as the
carrot to the stick of military force or institutional pressure, Eisen and the Brookings
institute recommend doing so in Eastern Europe as we mentioned. A key source of
contention in the Russian presidential election of 1996 was the rules and arrangement of a
much-needed IMF bailout package for Russia. The election of President Yeltsin and his
programs of further liberalization were key to the processing of favorable terms to the aid
package finalized in 1998. Conditionality was applied but unfortunately on the back end.
The aid was given with the promise that Yeltsin would “stay on the right path” and stay
he did; overseeing the worst economic decade in the Russian collective memory. 103 That
funding has continued despite democratic backsliding through the 2000s, thus making a
mockery of conditionality.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION
First, I have a general critique that I would be remiss if I didn’t air it. Any model
of democratization, including Diamond’s, Eisen’s, my own, Fukuyama’s, or Baloyra’s
puts a preeminence on democratization over a conception of state sovereignty. This
theoretical preference justifies a very real power disparity when the U.S. is supporting the
democratizing project because very few states have the real ability to resist the U.S.’s
imposed international order. Taking as a given that democracy and its expansion even in
its worst form spreading around the world is laudable; I think any conception of
democratization that places it above a conception of state sovereignty and the right to rule
as the sovereign, legitimate or otherwise, sees fit is a dangerous misunderstanding of the
system of real politic that states operate under. In his book, Russia Against the Rest
Richard Sakwa argues that Russia, meaning the military and political personnel involved
in negotiations and commenting on political affairs, fundamentally sees itself as global
power deserving an equal say in international affairs and the U.S. theorized and acted in
direct disregard for any sense of Russian sovereignty. As Sakwa puts it so well, Russian
policy officials, intelligence officials, and military personnel envisioned joining the
international order as equals and voiced that view vociferously; the U.S. was intent on
sublimating Russia into a western world order as a new middling power sitting just below
the U.S. in the vein of Germany after World War II. No matter what theory of
54

democratization the U.S. used to drive its policy action it would not give due deference to
Russian sovereignty and its political path and would be doomed to failure at the hands of
Russian statesmen concerned with piloting their own political destiny; chafing at the
international order.
Secondly, to our original question; I think the strongest critique I can make is that
the U.S. clearly was overly focused on economic reform, to the de facto detriment of
democratic reform in Russia. The direct policy and program implementation the U.S.
underwent during this period directly conflated the expansion of capitalism with the
expansion of democracy in the way that scholars like Fukuyama theorized. Programs like
the SEED and FREEDOM support acts, within their written text, conflated democracy
with market reforms and almost single-mindedly directed the bureaucratic power of the
executive and the funding power of congress directly to programs and institutions whose
stated goals were liberalizing trade agreements, enticing American investors, and
ensuring the free flow of capital to, and more importantly, from Russia and the former
Soviet Bloc. To the degree that politicians and foreign policy bureaucrats were aware of
modernization theory and the other works we have mentioned; revealed preferences
indicate that economic reform was certainly primary amongst their concerns.
Going forward, any serious and scholarly attempts at spreading democracy, as
defined as a key goal of U.S. foreign policy, must be prepared to deal systemically and
holistically with the political path and national sense of self developed in almost every
country. In the landmark cases whereby, democracy was instituted abroad at the behest of
foreign powers, Germany and Japan, both states were effectively decimated politically,
55

socially, and economically and were rebuilt from the ground up. In the case of Russia, as
I have said multiple times, Russia has a sense of national self; astride east and west, an
international player in Europe, Asia, the Pacific, and the Arctic. Since the turn of the 20th
century it envisioned playing a legitimate role in shaping the structures of the
international system to its own benefit. When confronted with a changing reality in the
1990s Russian political leaders commented to the point of expecting an equal seat at the
table with deference given to their role as the successor state of one of two superpowers
in the history of the world. 104 American diplomats dismissed these concerns and
explained Russia’s contemporary role alongside Germany, France, Brazil, and India as
bigger than average powers sublimated into the U.S. international order. 105
Next, future democratization programs must, in the allocation of their mission and
funding, divorce the expansion of democracy from the expansion of capitalism to work to
provide funding for institutions and actors who actually support democracy abroad by
building and applying pressure, tying funding and institutional access to democratic
conditionality, and funding and distributing liberation technology in a time when
surveillance capitalism in expanding rapidly inside and out of authoritarian countries
more in line with the theoretical model we built. 106 Analysis of the subsequent decades
and the specific democratization programs implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, parts of

104

Sakwa, Richard. Russia against the Rest: the Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
105

Ibid

106

Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: the Fight for a Human Future
at the New Frontier of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2020.
56

Africa, and elsewhere around world would be necessary to answer the question of the
fundamental concerns of more modern democratization projects after this period
stretching across the Clinton, Bush jr., and Obama Administrations. However, the
American political path, in development since the time of the founding fathers, has
placed the role of capitalism and trade at the forefront of the National mission. So much
so that when concerned solely with the spread of democracy John Quincy Adams, as Sec.
of State, warned his contemporaries, “America does not go abroad in search of monsters
to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the
champion and vindicator only of her own” and to the role of economics George
Washington said in a letter in Benjamin Harrison, “A people… who are possessed of the
spirit of commerce, who see and who will pursue their advantages may achieve almost
anything” and so I struggle to imagine a U.S. in which market-based economic reform
plays a secondary role to promotion of authentic popular governance. 107 108
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